What Is the Implicit Contract Model

This traditional perspective of work and career, as reflected in most classical “career development models” (cf. Brown and Brooks 1990, Osipow 1983, Super 1957), obviously includes principles such as stability in the working environment (p.B. the pursuit of the organization and role of work), movement through hierarchical promotion and inter-organizational mobility, and constant availability of positions and work roles in accordance with the interests, talents and lifestyle preferred by the person. It sees organizations as a “caring” entity that plays an active role in shaping the career of the employee or manager. This traditional career perspective was accompanied by two institutions that defined the context of the “place of professional responsibility”. (a) The “psychological contract”, the mutual relationships and expectations between the employee and the organization (= unwritten relationship contract): What an employee thinks he owes to the organization and what he thinks he can expect from the organization for it. A psychological contract thus creates long-term security (for both parties) and a high degree of commitment and loyalty to the organization on the part of the employee. For the employee, this had the advantage of having a valuable job and a position that allowed him to climb a hierarchical career ladder in planned stages. For the organization, this model ensured a steady supply of talented employees with a high level of commitment who aspired to take on new and expanded roles – perhaps even putting personal interests first. “Downsizing”, “downsizing” and “collective redundancies” have invalidated this contract. Employees can no longer rely on a “link” with their company that goes beyond the contractually agreed salary.

The rationing of credit in the amount of loans is also known as credit restrictions. In recent years, many macroeconomists have become interested in company-level data and business behavior. There is ample evidence to support the hypothesis that credit restrictions could be important determinants of business growth and survival. [16] [17] Many of these studies model credit constraint as the consequence of an optimal implicit contract when asymmetric information is available between the borrower and the lender. [18] [19] Thus, despite its declining popularity among labor economists, implicit contract theory still plays an important role in understanding the imperfections of the capital market. The primary ability of successful underwriting companies is to smooth out information frictions and conflicting interests of issuers and investors. Information frictions can prevent issuers and investors from agreeing on mutually acceptable prices for new issues. Issuers seek to maximize the proceeds of the new issue by selling at the highest possible offer price, while investors seek to maximize return by buying at offer prices below the market value of the new securities. Underwriting companies can hardly afford to disappoint both parts of their clients, as both are necessary for survival in the underwriting industry. As a result, policyholders enter into implied contracts with both parties that allow the parties to achieve their objectives, usually through multiple transactions with the same underwriter.

For example, an issuer may be willing to accept a lower offer price in order to have the opportunity to obtain better analyst coverage in anticipation of a follow-up issue. Or investors can agree to buy new, less promising issues to participate in future “hot” issues managed by the subscriber. These counterparty agreements are not explicitly stated in subscription agreements, but are believed to have power because they are backed by the reputation capital of the underwriter at stake (Morrison and Wilhelm, 2007). In order to comply with these implicit obligations and impose non-opportunistic behavior, especially on the investor side, underwriting companies must have a regular flow of transactions. Implicit contracts can work if investors understand that breaches are excluded from future bargains and lose their long-term benefits. In the browning analysis and subsequent documents on the pension vote, it is assumed that agents vote once and for all. This hypothesis, although practical, is strong. Why should young people support the system when the tax rate will be re-elected tomorrow and therefore there is no direct link between the contributions they make and the benefits they receive? The answer is that there is an implicit contract between generations: young people support the system because of the danger of being punished by future generations.


David West
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